About

Iran has one of the most restrictive internet censorship systems in the world. According to Freedom House, the country scored 11 out of 100 in the Freedom on the Net 2024 index and has been classified as "Not Free" for many consecutive years. The government permanently blocks access to hundreds of thousands of websites and platforms, including X, formerly known as Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, most international news websites, and many others. It is estimated that more than 5 million websites are filtered in Iran. Internet censorship intensified after the 2009 Green Movement protests and escalated again following the 2022 protests sparked by the death of Jina Mahsa Amini in morality police custody. Iran also ranked 176th out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index in both 2024 and 2025.[1][2][4]

For the roughly 90 million people living in Iran, reaching these blocked platforms usually requires a VPN. VPN use is technically illegal under Iranian law, yet it is widely used out of necessity, including privately by government officials and their families. These connections are often slow, unreliable, and subject to periodic crackdowns. This situation is the result of Iran spending years dismantling net neutrality. Net neutrality means that all internet users should have equal access to the same online content and services, without discrimination based on who they are or what they want to access. By abandoning that principle, Iran built the legal and technical system needed for a discriminatory two tier internet, where access to information depends on political loyalty instead of being a universal right.[6][11]

A "white SIM card," known in Persian as سیم‌کارت سفید and colloquially called a "white line" or خط سفید, is a special mobile line issued through Iran's telecommunications infrastructure that is completely exempt from the national filtering system. Ordinary SIM cards in Iran route data through deep packet inspection systems and filtering gateways that identify and block prohibited content. White SIM cards bypass those gateways entirely, giving users direct, unfiltered access to the global internet. Iranian journalists and activists have reported on the existence of white SIM cards for years, although the Iranian government does not officially acknowledge this parallel internet system.[1][7][8]

These lines are not sold in shops. They are quietly allocated to a select group estimated at around 16,000 people out of Iran's 90 million population. Recipients are drawn from people considered loyal to the Islamic Republic, including senior government ministers and officials, commanders and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC, judges and judiciary figures, state television and radio journalists at IRIB, editors of government affiliated newspapers, and intelligence personnel. Critics call these "blood SIM cards" or سیمکارت خونی because many holders are involved in violent suppression of protests. This selective distribution ensures that people who shape public discourse and enforce government policy have unrestricted access to the same platforms they help keep blocked for ordinary citizens.[4][9]

Someone with a white SIM card can access any website in the world, including X, Instagram, YouTube, and Google, directly from Iran, on any phone or device connected to that SIM, with no VPN, no restrictions, and full speed access. Everyone else in the country is denied that same access. This creates a basic inequality. Government officials can freely use global platforms to spread their messaging and shape public narratives, while ordinary Iranians risk prosecution, face slow and unstable connections, and deal with constant VPN disruptions just to do the same.

X, formerly known as Twitter, provides a public transparency feature called "About this account." It shows the country from which the account most recently connected to X. In 2025, this feature became especially useful for identifying accounts that appear to use direct, unfiltered internet access in countries where X is blocked.

This detail matters. X is blocked in Iran. An ordinary person in Iran using X would appear to connect from Germany, the Netherlands, or wherever their VPN server is located, not from Iran itself. But someone using a white SIM card connects directly from Iran with no VPN, so the "Account based in" field shows Iran or West Asia.

This is the evidence WhiteSimWatch collects. When a government official or an IRGC affiliated journalist posts on a platform that millions of fellow citizens cannot freely access, the connection country field reveals the two tier system they benefit from. Some of these accounts list London, Toronto, or other diaspora cities as their public location. However, the "Account based in" metadata shows a direct connection from Iran. This gap between the self reported location and the actual connection origin is an important data point that WhiteSimWatch records and archives.

WhiteSimWatch is an open, community driven transparency tool. Anyone can submit an X/Twitter account for review. The system automatically checks the "About this account" data for that profile. If the connection country is Iran or West Asia, the account is added to the public registry.

The registry is permanent. Even if an account later switches to a VPN, deletes its profile, or changes its username, the historical evidence remains in the database, with timestamped snapshots showing exactly what was recorded and when.

There is no political test for being listed here. The only criterion is technical: does the account show a direct connection from Iran? If yes, it is documented.

White SIM cards are one of the clearest examples of what happens when a government deliberately abandons net neutrality. Net neutrality means that all internet users should have equal access to the same online content and services, regardless of who they are or what their political views may be. Over many years, Iran systematically dismantled this principle and built a discriminatory two tier system. Open internet access for regime loyalists, and a heavily censored experience for everyone else. This is the logical outcome of breaking net neutrality. Once a government has the technical power to filter and control internet traffic selectively, it can use that system not only to censor content, but also to discriminate between users based on political loyalty. Government officials and state media figures can freely use platforms like X to publish content, shape public narratives, and engage with international audiences, while the people they govern are blocked from joining the same conversation.[2][6][11]

This is a direct attack on freedom of speech and the right to information. When the state decides who may access the open internet based on political loyalty, it does more than create unequal access. It turns censorship into a tool of control and discrimination. Ordinary Iranians are denied the ability to read independent news, publish their views, organize politically, and connect with the wider world on platforms that are freely available to regime insiders. The system is designed to silence dissent and amplify only state approved voices. This discrimination based on political affiliation is a fundamental human rights violation, especially under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to seek, receive, and share information and ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers.[3][5][10]

Go to the home page. Paste an X/Twitter handle like @username, a full profile link like https://x.com/username, or any post URL into the input box and press Check. The system will fetch the connection country from X and tell you whether the account appears to use direct Iranian access.

If confirmed, the account is added to the tracked list immediately. If the account is out of scope, meaning no Iranian connection is found, it will not be added. You can check again later, since the data shown on X may change over time.

You can also check X/Twitter accounts directly through our Telegram bot, without visiting the website.

Send a username like @username, a profile URL, or any post URL to the bot. It checks the connection country and notifies you of the result. If the account connects from Iran or West Asia, it is automatically added to the public registry.

WhiteSimWatch has an official presence on X, formerly known as Twitter. Follow us to receive updates when new accounts are added to the registry, learn about project developments, and stay informed about internet censorship in Iran.

By following and sharing, you help raise awareness about the two tier internet system in Iran and the existence of white SIM cards.

All scan data is automatically committed to a public GitHub repository in real time. Each record includes the raw API responses from Twitter/X so anyone can independently verify that the data on this website is genuine. The git history provides a permanent timestamp trail where records can only be appended and never altered.

WhiteSimWatch only surfaces data that is already publicly visible on X. It does not access or store any private information. It simply brings public transparency data together in one place. This project does not follow a specific political agenda and does not promote any particular narrative or viewpoint. Its purpose is only to document what is already visible in public.

You can contact this project at [email protected]

WhiteSimWatch is a volunteer run project with no institutional funding. If you find this tool useful, you can support its development by donating cryptocurrency to the addresses below.

We would like to thank the xforensics project, an open-source tool for forensic analysis of X/Twitter accounts related to internet censorship in Iran. We have also used its publicly available database to supplement our records.

We also acknowledge IranXGate, a project dedicated to documenting the users of white SIM cards in Iran. IranXGate maintains a comprehensive, categorized database of X/Twitter accounts that connect from inside Iran using privileged, unfiltered internet access.

We also recognize the Location Gate Telegram channel, which actively reports and documents these accounts by posting screenshots directly from X/Twitter.